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Constitutional protections for religious freedom (and related freedoms of conscience, belief
and association and equality), once interpreted by courts and tribunals, apply in a precedential
manner to future cases. They have an influence well beyond the particular community to which
they first applied. For this reason, religious communities have increasingly banded together
and sought to intervene or even, on occasion, to initiate legal actions asserting or defending
their rights. This article reviews some of the principles around the freedom of religion as
understood in South Africa and Canada to show how courts have understood the freedom
of religion in its social context. In addition, interfaith cooperation is discussed with particular
reference to the recent process which led to the formation of a Charter of Religious Rights
and Freedoms pursuant to Section 234 of the South African Constitution (which is attached
to the article). This section, a unique provision in any constitution, allows for the creation of
additional Charters to give greater specificity to the general language of the Constitution itself.
As such, it is an encouragement to civil society to determine what it thinks are the important
provisions that should be spelled out to give guidance to politicians and the judiciary. Awide
variety of religious groups participated in the creation of the Charter. The Charter does not
claim to be, nor could it be, exhaustive of such concerns but demonstrates that religions can
cooperate across a host of issues in education, health care, employment and other issues. The
next stage – passage into law, is still in the future but the first important hurdle has been
crossed with the signing of the Charter in October of 2010. The Charter might be a template for
other countries though changes would be necessary to deal with local issues.

Introduction
The creation, under Section 234 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 of a South
African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms, is a development of major world importance.
It will be, once passed into law, the first Charter created under this section. Its signing, at a public
ceremony at the University of Johannesburg on October 21, 2010, in Johannesburg, concluded the
first phase of civil society discussions, meetings, drafting and redrafting.1 Next it moves to the
political phase for further discussions and it is hoped, eventual passage into law.
In the course of the preparation of the Charter, significant consultations with every major religious
group (and many that would be considered minor) occurred and comments were assiduously
considered by the Continuity Committee and the draft amended many times in response to these
comments. The Continuity Committee was made up of some eight persons – one of whom is the
writer of this article. The author has been involved in this process since near the beginning, and
this article sets out some of the background to this work which remains, in some ways, a work
in progress. Beyond the utility of the process to date (which has been most useful already in
establishing links and discussion between widely diverse groups), should the Charter become a
legal document, it will be the first such Charter created in South Africa and, because of the unique
provision in the South African Constitution, likely the first of its kind anywhere. It will be possible,
perhaps, to emulate it through laws in other countries but that is beyond the scope of this article.
The Charter’s significance time alone will tell, but in view of the number of groups consulted, the
time spent considering the language of the text and the number of areas covered, it has no equals
in South African constitutional history.
1.The public signing ceremony occurred on Thursday, 21 October 2010 in the Main Board Room of the University of Johannesburg.
The event was attended by over a hundred delegates representing all the major religions of South Africa and several of the key
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including the Section 185 (1) (of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996)
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Culture, Religious and Linguistic Communities. The event was covered
by major radio and television. Various media interviews were conducted and the signing was mentioned on Radio 702 and the main
evening television news on the South African Broadcasting Commission (SABC). Five people spoke at the ceremony: Constitutional
Court Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke (who spoke on the legal history of the idea of religious liberty), Professor Marinus
Wiechers (former Vice-Chancellor, University of South Africa, who spoke on the importance of religious liberty), Dr Nokuzola Ndende
(Continuation Committee Member, who spoke on African Customary Religions), Professor Iain Benson (Canada and the University of
the Free State, Continuation Committee Member, who gave an International Perspective) and Professor Rassie Malherbe (University
of Johannesburg and Continuation Committee Member, who gave an overview of the Charter itself). A Council of Religious Rights and
Freedoms was established by vote of the signatories present pursuant to section 185 (1) (c) and work in relation to that is ongoing.
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What exactly is the proposed South
African Charter of Religious Rights
and Freedoms?
Before reviewing the actual document and its specific
rationale, it is useful to discuss some framework issues in
relation to it. In particular, it is useful to put the Charter in
context by discussing what courts have said about the nature
and importance of religion generally.

Religion is recognised as being
important to societies and courts
have recognised this
Religions are very significant to cultures and the courts, and
at least in this country this has been recognised.
Consider this statement from a South African Constitutional
Court decision of a decade ago in its well known decision
dealing with the question of corporal punishment for
children in schools. Interestingly this decision (but not the
passage referred to here) which deals with religious faith
and culture, was referred to in a recent Supreme Court of
Canada decision touching on religious rights. Here is what
the South African court said in Christian Education South
Africa v Minister of Education:
For many believers, their relationship with God or creation is
central to all their activities. It concerns their capacity to relate
in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of themselves,
their community and their universe. For millions in all walks
of life, religion provides support and nurture and a framework
for individual and social stability and growth. Religious belief
has the capacity to awake concepts of self-worth and human
dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights. It affects
the believer’s view of society and founds the distinction between
right and wrong. (Christian Education South Africa v Minister
of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC):para. 36; Currie & De Waal
2005:336–357; Farlam 2003:ch. 41; Bruker v Marcovitz 2007 3 S.C.R.
607; Boonstra & Benson 2008)

Note in this passage that it is not a particular religion that is
singled out here. The importance of religion ‘for millions in
all walks of life’ is not limited to any particular religion and
it will be noted that the protection of the freedom of religion
in the Bill of Rights is not limited to any particular religion.
In fact, the provision that protects ‘religion’ also protects the
rights of ‘belief’ and of ‘culture’ and this, too, is not unusual.
Section 9(3) of the Constitution expressly prohibits unfair
discrimination on a wide list of grounds. It reads:
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender,
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth.

In a Canadian context, one of the sections that guarantees
the right of religious freedom guarantees it equally with
‘conscience’ and section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Part II of the Constitution Act 1982)
reads ‘conscience and religion’.
http://www.hts.org.za
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Nowhere can a passage be found in a Canadian Supreme
Court decision, or any other with which the author is
familiar, that says the sort of thing referred to above from
the Christian Education decision in South Africa. Canadian
judges, and those in other countries, are much less confident
about the important cultural role of religion or, alternatively,
do not speak in such encouraging terms about it.

What is wrong with simply leaving
the development of principles to
the courts on a case-by-case basis?

The limitations of litigation as a means of
developing sound social policy and building civic
society
Litigation is not ideal for airing all the relevant issues in
relation to important matters. There are various reasons for
this.
Firstly, in any particular piece of litigation there is a ‘hit and
miss’ aspect to what parties are before the court as litigants
either as parties or as interveners. The latter, often having the
greatest expertise in an area, also typically have a limited role
in terms of taking the court record as it is found and having
shorter time for argument and reduced written argument
lengths et cetera.
Secondly, litigation is not the best strategy for a society to use
as a method for nation building or the creation of communities
of respect. The nature of the litigation means that not all
aspects that should be dealt with are dealt with, often for
political reasons. Thus, there was very little before the court
in the same-sex marriage litigation in Canada dealing with
the effects of single-sex parenting on children. The Attorney
General of Canada lawyers had been instructed not to say
or imply anything negative at all about ‘same-sex parenting’
and that political direction obviously affected what materials
were before the Courts.2 By way of comparison, when the
matter was actually debated and analysed in France (at least
up until 2013 when unexamined political considerations
again kicked in) that country decided to reject ‘same-sex
marriage’. This shows that, sometimes to a considerable
degree, political or ideological concerns can lead to restraints
on what sorts of information will be put before the court
and, as the French situation showed up until the unilateral
changes in 2013, such studies (psychological, anthropological
and so on) can have a determinative outcome at least for a
certain period of time. (National Assembly [France] 2006).3
Thirdly, there is the question of cost and who can afford to
appear before the courts. Many of those in a position to make
important arguments can simply not afford to be there.
2.The author acted as counsel, co-counsel or legal advisor for the Interfaith
Coalition for Marriage and the Family in the Canadian challenges (launched in
three jurisdictions) to the common-law recognition of marriage as heterosexual
and was told this by one of the counsel for the Federal Attorney General in one
of the provincial litigations. That counsel has preferred to remain anonymous. The
decisions are discussed in detail in the article by Lafferty cited in footnote 14.
3.That Report in both full French and partial English versions may be consulted at
http://www.preservemarriage.ca/docs/France_Report_on_the_Family_Edited.pdf
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Quite apart from these particular limitations to litigation,
there is the wider problem that if power to determine all
aspects of social policy shifts to the courts there is a temptation
that with difficult matters (such as abortion or same-sex
marriage) politicians try to avoid what to them is politically
dangerous ground by shunting such determinations to
activist courts rather than exercising political leadership
to make determinations in the more suitable forum of
legislative chambers. This was seen very clearly in the
Marriage Reference in Canada where Justice Committee
hearings on a proposed piece of legislation were simply
cancelled once the government decided to state a Marriage
Reference to the Supreme Court of Canada doing an ‘endrun’ both around the normal appeal process of cases in the
courts and their own Justice Committee hearings. It was not
democracy’s finest hour in Canada when that occurred. But
there is an even larger problem than this: by encouraging the
courts to be primary formers of public policy in complicated
areas without proper political and civil society inputs there is
a reduced scope for negotiated compromises.

(A.G.) 2003 BCCA 406, Halpern v Canada, [2003] O.J. No. 2268
and the Marriage Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 S.C.R.
698, 2004 SCC 79, 2002–2006) all had interfaith interventions.

As Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (2001) has noted:

In the same-sex marriage litigation in Canada, and cases
leading up to it, various groups including the Evangelical
Fellowship of Canada (representing some 30 or so Protestant
churches), joined together with the Canadian Conference of
Catholic Bishops to form a coalition to argue that pressure on
the ‘traditional’ definitions of marriage would eventually put
pressure on the religions themselves.

Judicial decisions are usually winner-take-all; either you win or
you lose. In particular judicial decisions about rights tend to be
conceived as all-or-nothing matters. The penchant to settle things
judicially, further polarized by rival special-interest campaigns,
effectively cuts down the possibilities of compromise. (p. 116)

Why interfaith religious
cooperation?
Some might ask why ‘interfaith’ religious cooperation should
exist. Here again, the short answer is that the Constitution
(in common with most countries) does not focus on ‘the
Christian religion’ but on ‘religion’ and what happens to one
religion in terms of an interpretation of the law will have an
influence and impact on other religions. So it is necessary for
those concerned about the rule of the law to recognise that
all religions ought to be concerned how other religions are
treated by politics and the law. In terms of formal cooperation,
however, it seems to me that Canada has just naturally
developed greater interfaith participation in relation to court
challenges given its slightly longer constitutional history and
court challenges program that existed for several years (the
Canadian Constitution was re-patriated from the UK in 1982).
Canada as a matter of fact has had a history of ‘interfaith’
coalitions making successful attempts at intervention in some
of the major court cases of the day where religious rights and
freedoms are at issue.
Interfaith coalitions intervened first, with regard to the status
of the unborn in a case dealing with abortion (Borowski v
Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, late 1980s).
Then, a few years later, in relation to statutory conjugal
language in statutes dealing with ‘sexual orientation’ in the
early to mid-1990s, (Egan and Nesbit v Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
513, 1995 SCC 49, 1994) similarly, as just mentioned, with
respect to same-sex marriage itself (Barbeau v British Columbia
http://www.hts.org.za

Interfaith, and sometimes expressly Christian groups (such
as the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada or the Canadian
Conference of Catholic Bishops), have also made frequent
representations to House and Senate Committees on a wide
variety of constitutional and social justice issues over the
years.
The expressly interfaith (as opposed to simply Christian)
coalitions that emerged in the 1990s in Canada were in part
responsive to the fact that the concerns about the cases were
shared across religious divides (such as the ‘sanctity of life’
with regard to the abortion issue). In addition, Canada, like
South Africa, understands itself to be multicultural and
pluralistic thereby lending a particular ‘fit’ to any application
before the court that claims to speak about multicultural and
inter-religious cooperation.4

This concern, first expressed in the Canadian Supreme Court
decision in Egan and Nesbit, (1995) 124 DLR (4th) 609, over the
inclusion of same-sex couples into the definition of ‘spouse’
in the federal Old Age Security Act (1952), though dismissed as
spurious by counsel for the claimant couple (and interveners
on their side of the case), was subsequently proven to
have been relevant. It was not much more than eight years
later that the challenges to the common-law recognition of
marriage as only between men and women arose in three
Canadian provinces – British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec.
Again, an ‘interfaith coalition for Marriage and the Family’
responded, retained counsel and went into court arguing
that attempts to force a national definition (the Federal
Constitutional power dealing with the capacity to marry)
of ‘marriage’ could put pressure to change their own
understandings about the nature of marriage.
Whether interfaith or simply Christian, these coalitions failed
to maintain a heterosexual-only recognition of marriage in
both countries. Still, their expressed concerns about pressure
being brought to bear on religious groups and individuals if
the law changed, was heard and due to the involvement of
religious groups arguing that their perspective be respected,
decisions of the highest courts in both countries made
express mention of religious protections. With respect to
4.Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires the Courts
to interpret the provisions of the Constitution so as to enhance Canada’s ‘multicultural heritage’; Sections 30 and 31 of the South African Constitution refer to the
rights of ‘language’ and ‘cultural life’ and the importance of ‘culture’, ‘religious’ and
‘linguistic’ communities. The Preamble to the Constitution of South Africa speaks of
a country ‘... united in diversity.’

doi:10.4102/hts.v69i1.1319
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this, the following decisions are relevant: the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage
2004 3 S.C.R. 710 (Can) (the Marriage Reference) and the
Constitutional Court of South Africa in Minister of Home
Affairs & Another v Fourie & (Doctors for Life International &
Others, amici curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project & Others
v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) (Fourie).

Interfaith coalitions and religious
concerns about same-sex marriage

5

The issue of marriage has been, if not the central focus of
conservative religious groups in Canada concerning public
policy, at least a major focus of these groups for well over
a decade. In South Africa religious or religiously motivated
groups similarly sought and obtained intervener standing
in the Fourie-litigation and made representations before the
Law Reform Commission.
Same-sex marriage, like the issue of abortion, has often
sparked the formation of religious groups appearing as
interveners before the courts in various countries. In many
Canadian cases, a wide variety of religious and ‘interfaith’
interveners appeared and made arguments about the place
and importance of religion in Canadian society. These
arguments attempted to explain why issues such as the status
of the unborn or same-sex marriage concerned religious
groups. For example, as discussed above, in litigations
involving same-sex marriage,6 the ‘Interfaith Coalition on
Marriage’, composed of the national associations of Hindus,
Sikhs, Muslims, Evangelical Protestants and Catholics,
applied for and received intervener status in the three
provinces where these cases were originally launched.7
On July 16, 2003, pursuant to Section 53 of the Supreme Court
Act (RSC ch. S 26 § 53 1985 [Can]) the Parliament submitted
three questions to the Supreme Court of Canada concerning
the constitutionality of a proposed Civil Marriage Act (Reference
re Same-Sex Marriage 2004 3 S.C.R. 698 [Can]). The third
question, dealing expressly with the issue of religion, asked
the following: ‘Does the Freedom of Religion guaranteed by
Section 2(a) of the Charter protect religious officials from
being compelled to perform same-sex marriages contrary
5.The following section draws upon Benson (2007:141ff.).
6.These cases were launched close together in three provinces, British Columbia,
Ontario, and Quebec. EGALE Canada Inc v Canada 2003 225 DLR 472 (Can);
Halpern v Canada 2003 65 OR3d 161 (Can); Hendricks v Canada 2004 238 DLR
577 (Can). The cases went to the appeal level in all provinces before the appeals
were abandoned prior to the Supreme Court of Canada level. The launching of the
Marriage Reference, by the Federal Government (a move not debated in the Liberal
caucus much less the House of Commons) caught many by surprise and, in effect,
conceded the main issues in the appeals and was a controversial ‘end run’ of the
usual appeals process.
7.Affidavits on behalf of the ‘Interfaith Coalition’ in the ‘same-sex marriage’ litigations,
for example, were filed on behalf of Judaism (Rabbi and political theorist David
Novak), Roman Catholicism (Professor Ernest Caparros, professor of Canon law
at the University of Ottawa and Professor Daniel Cere, Catholic political theorist
at McGill University), Islam (Abdulla Idris Ali, past President of the Islamic Society
of North America), and Evangelical Protestantism (Professor Craig Gay at Regent
College). In each case, the teachings of the religious perspective with reference
to the nature and place of marriage, the need for respect for the other groups
and citizens irrespective of their sexual orientations, and concerns about where
a reconfigured constitutional norm would place the religious groups themselves,
were the focus of the affidavits. At the Appeal Court levels, various ‘reformed’
religious groups appeared in an effort to counter the traditional religious voices.

http://www.hts.org.za
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to their religious beliefs?’ (p. 721). The Supreme Court’s
decision in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage addressed these
constitutionality concerns and demonstrated the Court’s
view on how religion coincides with sexual orientation rights
in Canada. The decision by the Court was unanimous. The
Justices’ submitted only one set of reasons for their holding,
and no individual Justice was credited as the author of the
judgement (p. 705). The decision ignored the argument that
‘marriage’ exists prior to the state and to law, and does not
depend upon (and never had in Canada) a ‘legal definition’.
The court quoted the leading English common-law case of
Hyde v Hyde (1866 1 LRP & D 130 [UK]) and, in particular
a passage referring to a Christian basis for marriage in
justifying its position:
What, then, is the nature of this institution as understood in
Christendom? Its incidents may vary in different countries, but
what are its essential elements and invariable features? If it be
of common acceptance and existence, it must needs (however
varied in different countries in its minor incidents) have some
pervading identity and universal basis. I conceive that marriage,
as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined
as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to
the exclusion of all others. (Reference re Same-Sex Marriage 2004 3
S.C.R. 710 (Can) – quoting Hyde v Hyde 1866 1 LRP & D 133 [UK])

Of this passage the Supreme Court opined that:
The reference to ‘Christendom’ is telling. Hyde spoke to a society
of shared social values where marriage and religion were
thought to be inseparable. This is no longer the case. Canada is a
pluralistic society. Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is
a civil institution. (p. 710)

The Court held that the first question (‘Is the proposed Act
within the Exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament
of Canada?’ [pp. 708, 717–718]), was relevant to Section 2
of the proposed Act, which stated, ‘nothing in this Act
affects the freedom of officials or religious groups to refuse
to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their
religious beliefs’ (p. 716).
The Court ruled that this provision was superfluous because
the question of the solemnization of marriages, Section 92(12)
of the Constitution Act 1867, gave the exclusive powers
over the ‘solemnization of marriages’ to the provinces (as
opposed to the capacity to marry – a federal issue), meaning
that anything governing religious officials with regard to the
performance of marriages must be governed provincially,
and was ultra vires the Federal Parliament (716). The Court
commented on the Act’s stated purpose and its preamble as
follows:
The preamble to the Proposed Act is also instructive. The
Act’s stated purpose is to ensure that civil marriage as a legal
institution is consistent with the Charter: WHEREAS, in order to
reflect values of tolerance, respect and equality consistent with
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, access to marriage
for civil purposes should be extended to couples of the same
sex; AND WHEREAS everyone has the freedom of conscience
and religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and officials of religious groups are free to refuse to perform
marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs …
(Reference re Same-Sex Marriage 2004 3 SCR 710 (Can):717–718)
doi:10.4102/hts.v69i1.1319
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The Court rejected the arguments made by certain religious
groups stating that the recognition of same-sex marriages
would discriminate against them (pp. 717–718). The Court,
in explaining its position, stated:
The mere recognition of the equality rights of one group cannot,
in itself, constitute a violation of the rights of another. The
promotion of Charter rights and values enriches our society as a
whole and the furtherance of those rights cannot undermine the
very principles the Charter was meant to foster. (p. 719)

In answer to concerns that civil access to ‘same-sex marriage’
would create a ‘collision of rights’ in the culture, the Court
said:
The protection of freedom of religion afforded by [§] 2(a)
of the Charter is broad and jealously guarded in our Charter
jurisprudence. We note that should impermissible conflicts
occur, the provision at issue will by definition fail the justification
test under [§] 1 of the Charter and will be of no force or effect
under [§] 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In this case the conflict
will cease to exist. (Reference re Same-Sex Marriage 2004 3 S.C.R.
710 [Can]:721)

On the third question, ‘does the freedom of religion guaranteed
by Section 2(a) of the Charter protect religious officials from
being compelled to perform same-sex marriages contrary to
their religious beliefs?’ (p. 721), the Court pointed out that
the compulsion which the question envisages, is by the state
(p. 721). It also stated that such compulsion for officials or
for ‘sacred places’ would violate the guarantee of freedom
of religion under § 2(a) (pp. 722–723). Most significantly, the
Court held this guarantee to be ‘broad enough to protect
religious officials from being compelled by the state to
perform civil or religious same-sex marriages that are contrary to
their religious beliefs’ (p. 723).8
Though these comments were strictly obiter on matters
relating to provincial jurisdiction and not before the Court
in the case, the Court’s statements, particularly with respect
to the use of ‘sacred places’ (Reference re Same-Sex Marriage
2004 3 S.C.R. 710 [Can]:722) gave some measure of comfort
to religious people though it left open various questions. For
example, would ‘sacred places’ be construed widely as befits
a liberal and broad reading of ‘religion’ or narrowly as befits a
limiting provision? Contrary to the Court’s statement a choice
between approaches is itself a sort of ‘rank-ordering’ that
does not make conflicts ‘disappear’. The increased amount
of litigation concerning religion that immediately followed
suggests that the line between religious communities and
the ‘new constitutional norm’ of same-sex inclusive marriage
will be at the forefront of future debates and litigation.9 It also
8.Emphasis added. See also Iacobucci (2003:137). The argument here is that
‘reconciling’ has advantages to ‘balancing’ as an analytical and practical tool in
certain types of cases. The article reviews where reconciliation might be the best
approach to what could, at first blush, appear to be a clash or conflict of rights.
Of course the judgement left unanalysed an equally practical question: whether
this protection for ‘religious officials’ would apply to the accommodation of civic
officials say, Marriage Commissioners operating under state licenses that base their
objections on the constitutional grounds of ‘conscience and religion’. That matter is
now before the courts in several Canadian provinces and as mentioned elsewhere
academic opinion is divided on how they should be resolved.
9.See, for example, Smith v Knights of Columbus 2005 BCHRT 544. Here a lesbian
couple sought to use a hall run by a Catholic organisation as a venue in which to hold
their marriage celebration. Before the Human Rights Tribunal of British Columbia,
the right of the religious group to restrict the use of its property with activities
consistent with the core beliefs of the group was upheld. Despite this, however,
the group was held to be liable for how it had dealt with the same-sex couple in the
process of renting and then cancelling the contract. See also Boonstra and Benson
(2006) (commenting on the situation regarding the scope of religious dissent to
same-sex marriage as to both ‘sacred places’ as well as to personal objections).
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suggests that seeking a modus vivendi between alternative
and irreconcilable positions might be more important than
vesting just one viewpoint (same-sex marriage) as a new
dominant position. Accomplishing this will require greater
principled nuance than has traditionally been viewed in the
‘same-sex rights advancement’ debates.
The Justice Committee of the Federal Government conducted
hearings on the proposed Government legislation (Bill C-38)
in the spring and early summer of 2004 but these were
cancelled as soon as the Marriage Reference was launched
That the process, fully underway would be cancelled
effectively circumventing the democratic voices in preference
to judicial ones was greeted with surprise and astonishment
by many of the members of this Committee which had by then
held many hearings and planned many more.10 The new Civil
Marriage Law that followed the Supreme Court decision and
subsequent hearings before legislative committees, included
amendments made as a result of suggestions by various
representations, made to the House and Senate Committees.
These amendments attempted to provide protection to the
religious groups that dissented from the new Constitutional
norm.
These amendments were passed, in part, to end the steady
series of lawsuits filed against individuals, churches and
groups, as well as to recognise the threats to religious groups
that were evidenced in public statements. Some of these had
expressly threatened religious communities or individuals on
the grounds that they posed a threat to the new Constitutional
(same-sex marriage inclusive) order. Certain activists went so
far as to publicly state their intention to file lawsuits against
religious charities if they did not begin to recognise samesex marriage, a result predicted by religious groups in their
argument against same-sex marriage recognition (Robinson
2002–2003; Hutchinson 2005:A1).
Once the state determines that same-sex marriage is a
constitutional right, religious beliefs upholding ‘traditional’
marriage will come increasingly into conflict with the new
constitutional norm until such time as greater principles
of public sphere sharing are developed. In order for this
to occur, claims by same-sex activists to public sphere
dominance, like all claims to dominance by one viewpoint on
legally contestable matters, need to be identified and rejected.
The status of a ‘tolerated discriminator’ looked – to many of
these groups and individuals – like pretty thin ice (to use a
particularly apt metaphor in a Canadian context) and that is
an ice upon which many religious groups and organisations
continue to feel themselves standing. The next section will
address specific examples to illustrate some of the tensions
that are emerging.

Tolerance of difference: Conflicting
rights
An example of how disputes between differing views of
marriage just do not ‘disappear’ with a balancing of rights
approach (as the Supreme Court of Canada implicitly
10.The process and details on these hearings may be found at: http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_marb5.htm

doi:10.4102/hts.v69i1.1319

Page 6 of 13

suggested) may be seen in a case before the Human
Rights Tribunal in British Columbia. Here a lesbian couple
approached a Catholic organisation, the Knights of Columbus,
to rent their hall for a marital celebration (Smith v Knights of
Columbus 2005 BCHRT 544). The right of the religious group
to restrict the use of its property with activities consistent
with the core beliefs of the group was upheld. Despite this,
however, the group was held to be liable for how it had dealt
with the same-sex couple in the process of renting and then
cancelling the contract (p. 544).
Commenting on the situation regarding the scope of religious
dissent to same-sex marriage (both as to ‘sacred places’ as
well as to personal objections) the authors of a comment
upon this decision observed:
The law in this area is a patchwork that needs clarification
both on the federal and provincial level. It would be a good
development if provincial legislatures, in particular, would fully
analyze the impact of same-sex marriage on religious groups and
legislate appropriate protection. Unless and until that happens,
courts and tribunals will have to use the limited tools at their
disposal to conduct this balancing. The results, like the outcome
in this case, may be very confusing and insufficiently attentive
to the real nature of a civil society in which people of differing
beliefs have to co-exist in a real world of civilized disagreement
on matters about which people may hold strong opinions and
have the right to disagree.11 (Boonstra & Benson 2006)

This sort of experience in Canada shows the importance of full,
frank and open discussion socially about the consequences of
same-sex marital inclusion or even the extent and reasons for
same-sex beneficial inclusion (as distinct from marriage) as
well as sufficient time, perhaps, to rethink how to deal with
the interests of all citizens.12
Justice Albie Sachs, formerly of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa, made the following thoughtful comment
regarding the search for equality:
Equality should not be confused with uniformity; in fact,
uniformity can be the enemy of equality. Equality means equal
concern and respect across difference. It does not presuppose
the elimination or suppression of difference. Respect for human
rights requires the affirmation of self, not the denial of self.
Equality therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation of
behaviour but an acknowledgment and acceptance of difference.
At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the basis
for exclusion, marginalisation, stigma and punishment. At best,
it celebrates the vitality that difference brings to any society.
(National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice
1998 12 BCLR 1517:1574–1575)

Of course, one has to be careful in taking this approach that
an unrealistic standard of human interaction is not adopted,
lest ‘hurt feelings’ be elevated to a constitutionally-protected
11.Regarding the notion of ‘society’ or ‘civil society’ Charles Taylor reminds us that
society is prior to the state (law and politics): ‘ … society is not constituted by the
state but limits it’ (Taylor 1995:287).
12.An extensive body of court decisions, Parliamentary speeches, and many academic�
articles concerning same-sex marriage, particularly from a Canadian perspective,
may be found at the website of the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law and
Culture – http://www.marriageinstitute.ca. From the other side of the argument
on same-sex marriage, the leading source of web-based articles and information
is the site of one of Canada’s most sophisticated same-sex activist organisations –
Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere (EGALE) – http://www.egale.ca.

http://www.hts.org.za

Original Research

category, thereby watering down to an unacceptable degree
the rigour of our conceptions of equality and dignity.13
As referred to above many religious bodies and interfaith
groups have intervened in important cases touching on
religious liberty over the past decade and a half in Canada.
They have seen first-hand in situations such as the eradication
of denominational education rights in Newfoundland and
Quebec (Constitution Act 1867 § 93A), that, in their view
religious communities and individual believers are often not
being accorded the respect they deserve and to which they
are entitled (MacDougall 2006:353–354).14 In Canada, many
religious believers and groups speak openly about feeling
excluded and threatened by developments they see around
them (Lafferty 2007:307–312). The breadth and depth of this
concern is not something that any citizen should take lightly
given the important role that religious beliefs play in society.
In South Africa, many religious believers were also concerned
where changes to the legal understanding of marriage would
take their own communities. Thus, in Fourie, religious groups
sought and obtained, status as amicus curiae based on an
affidavit by Cardinal Wilfred Napier, of the Roman Catholic
Church.
In Christian Education, as we saw above, the majority of the
Court was quite willing to comment on the importance of
religious beliefs to South African society; we see the same
openness in other more recent decisions of the same Court
(Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000
4 SA 757 (CC):para. 36; Currie & De Waal 2005:336–357;
Farlam 2003:ch. 41; Bruker v Marcovitz 2007 SCC 54; Boonstra
& Benson 2008).
In Fourie, the majority of the Court found religious beliefs
and their associations to be socially important in these terms:
Religious bodies play a large and important part in public life,
through schools, hospitals and poverty relief programmes.
They command ethical behaviour from their members and bear
witness to the exercise of power by state and private agencies;
they promote music, art and theatre; they provide halls for
community activities, and conduct a great variety of social
activities for their members and the general public. They are part
of the fabric of public life, and constitute active elements of the
diverse and pluralistic nation contemplated by the Constitution.
Religion is not just a question of belief or doctrine. It is part of a
people’s temper and culture, and for many believers a significant
part of their way of life. Religious organisations constitute
important sectors of national life and accordingly have a right
to express themselves to government and the courts on the great
issues of the day. They are active participants in public affairs
fully entitled to have their say with regard to the way law is
made and applied. (Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie
& Doctors for Life International & Other; Lesbian and Gay Equality
Project & Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 [CC]:
paras. 90–93 & 98)
13.The following decision of the Supreme Court of Canada has been subjected to just�
this criticism: Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 1999 1
S.C.R. 497 (Can) and Granovsky v Canada 2000 SCJ No. 28. For a review discussing
both decisions see Benson and Miller (2000).
14.In favour of accommodating the right of officials not to perform same-sex marriages
on the basis that tolerance allows for disagreement, see Lafferty (2007:307–312).
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Important to note here is the fact that the Court finds religion
not simply to be an ‘individual’ matter but something
important for the community and the whole society.15 The
Court continued, however, with this observation setting out
a limitation on the public use of religious argumentation:
It is one thing for the Court to acknowledge the important role
that religion plays in our public life. It is quite another to use
religious doctrine as a source for interpreting the Constitution. It
would be out of order to employ the religious sentiments of some
as a guide to the constitutional rights of others … Whether or
not the Biblical texts support his beliefs would certainly not be a
question which this Court could entertain. From a constitutional
point of view, what matters is for the Court to ensure that he
be protected in his right to regard his marriage as sacramental,
to belong to a religious community that celebrates its marriages
according to its own doctrinal tenets, and to be free to express
his views in an appropriate manner both in public and in Court.
Further than that the Court could not be expected to go. (Minister
of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Doctors for Life International &
Other; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project & Others v Minister of Home
Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC):paras. 92, 93 & 98)

What the court wishes to see is coexistence within difference.
If the experience in Canada is anything to go on, however,
it is reasonable to suggest that such coexistence is going to
require a considerable amount of litigation in order for the
genuinely ‘open’ nature of the public sphere to be ensured.
In the process of such litigation, a Charter of the sort that has
now been signed in South Africa could be of considerable
guidance to the courts and legislatures in terms of the key
principles to be applied, though whether a genuinely open
form of pluralism can be realised and maintained remains an
open question.
Litigation in Canada over the past years has shown that
for matters such as public school curricula, letters to the
press, employment contracts and the nature of religious
organisations themselves, it could be said that eternal
litigation, rather than vigilance, is the price to be paid for
liberty. This brings me to more particular questions about
the creation of the South African Charter of Religious Rights
and Freedoms.

Why a charter in addition to the
enumerated rights?

Two forms of civil society response to
legislatures and courts – South African and
Canadian
The role that religions could play in relation to the ongoing
formation of the South African constitution was understood
early on by Justice Albie Sachs (1990) when he wrote:
Ideally in South Africa, all religious organizations and persons
concerned with the study of religion would get together and
draft a charter of religious rights and responsibilities. … it would
be up to the participants themselves to define what they consider
to be their fundamental rights. (pp. 46–47)
15.I have written about the tension between the right of religion and belief to be
viewed ‘individualistically’ rather than in its (preferred) dimension – associationally;
both aspects should be kept in view. See Benson (2008:297, 297–312).
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Section 234 of the Constitution of South Africa stipulates
as follows: ‘In order to deepen the culture of democracy
established by this Constitution, Parliament may adopt
Charters of Rights consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution.’
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
was based in part on the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The Canadian Charter contains no provision
similar to Section 234 of the South African Constitution.
The Canadian Charter provided a method of democratic
response to judicial decisions by way of an override provision
(Section 33) which allows laws to be continued in force for a
limited time despite a judicial declaration of constitutional
invalidity.16 Such a declaration is time-limited making it, so
the theory goes, an election issue upon which a Government
using such a declaration could fall. Given the political
realities of South Africa, with the dominance of one party,
such a provision would not work in principle or in practice
as it could effectively suspend the Constitution without the
likelihood of the ballot box providing accountability.
Section 234, on the other hand, gives South Africans a means
to offer guidance to both politics and the courts though,
since it has not been used until now, it is not certain what the
political process will do to the work with which civil society
(in terms of the major religions) has already been involved.
In principle, however, Section 234 gives those who come up
with such charters, emerging from civil society, the chance
to specify in greater detail what they think matters and the
location of Section 234 in the Constitution suggests that
legislation passed under this provision will be accorded a
kind of ‘super statutory’ or constitutional status by virtue of
that inclusion.
So what has happened in South Africa to date in terms of
the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms?

History of the South African Charter
of Religious Rights and Freedoms
The first formal substantive step towards the formation of
the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms
was when a group of legal and theological academics called
a meeting in Stellenbosch in October 2007 at which a variety
of groups (primarily Christian at the beginning though this
16.Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads as follows:
‘33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an
Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a
provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section
2 or sections 7 to 15.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under
this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the
provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five
years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the
declaration.
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made
under subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4).’
A useful review of this provision has been prepared by Johansen and Rosen (2008)
of the Law and Government Division of the Library of Parliament.
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changed over time) met to discuss the background to such
a document and whether it would be advisable to develop
such a document. The author spoke about the Canadian
experience of ‘interfaith cooperation’ and how such
cooperation is essential in constitutional democracies formed
around notions of pluralism and multiculturalism.17

Original Research

4.

(a) Section 9 (the right to equality): the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,
Act 4 of 2000
(b) Section 23 (labour rights): the Labour Relations Act, Act
66 of 1995
(c) Section 32 (the right to access to information): the
Promotion of Access to Information Act, Act 2 of 2000
(d) Section 33 (the right to administrative justice): the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, Act 3 of 2000

One conclusion of that meeting was that representation
had to be extended further afield to invite all the major
religions (including African customary religions) to attend to
comment upon a basic draft that was to be prepared prior
to that meeting and that particular care should be taken to
invite all religions to the table.
The draft was prepared by a small working group and a
further meeting called for February 14, 2008. Prior to that
meeting an invitation was sent out to every major religion
in South Africa inviting participation and stressing that the
draft was completely open for discussion and was not in any
way ‘set in stone’.
The rationale document attached to the invitation which
went out over the signature of theologian Dr Pieter Coertzen
from Stellenbosch (but largely drafted by law Professor
Rassie Malherbe from the University of Johannesburg) stated
as follows:
Motivation for a Charter of Religious Rights for South Africa:
1.

Section 234 of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996, provides that ‘in order to deepen the culture of
democracy established by the Constitution, Parliament may
adopt Charters of Rights consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution’, which charters will then, have the force of law.
The Constitution envisages, in other words, that the rights
in the Constitution may be further extended, supplemented
and given content by way of such charters.

2.

The room which Section 234 creates for a charter of
religious rights provides religious institutions with a golden
opportunity to take the initiative in a matter that is crucially
important to every religious person and institution. In an
open, free and democratic society it cannot be left to the
state alone to determine the content of our rights. Structures
such as religious institutions should make a contribution in
areas in which they have a direct interest and of which they
have intimate knowledge. If religious institutions succeed
in submitting to the state a consensus proposal regarding
a charter of religious rights, the state will hardly be able to
ignore it. Thus, religious institutions will be able to leave
their own significant imprint on the content of the right to
freedom of religion and on the evergreen question regarding
the relationship between religion and the state.

3.

The Constitution creates this room for additional charters of
rights because most rights guaranteed in the Constitution are
described in cryptic, vague and general terms. The intention
is that society, and specifically the state by way of legislation
and other measures, and the courts through their judgments,
must over time give further content to these rights. For
example, the right to freedom of religion is protected in so
many words in Section 15 of the Constitution, but Section 15
provides nothing else about the content of the right.

17.Both terms admit of a variety of interpretations. Whatever interpretations are
given, however, extension of cooperation beyond simply one racial or religious
group is implied and important.
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In the case of several rights in the Constitution the state
has already adopted separate acts of Parliament to further
describe the content and application of the rights concerned.
The following examples may be mentioned:

Directly or indirectly, numerous other acts give effect
to the rights in the Constitution as well, as in the case of
health, housing, education, the environment, the rights of
children, the right to vote, and the rights of accused persons
and prisoners. In addition, Section 234 creates yet another
opportunity for such supplementary legislation.
5.

There are a few reasons why a charter of religious rights may
serve a useful purpose.
5.1. The right to freedom of religion as guaranteed in the
Constitution is an important instrument regulating
the relationship between religion and the state. As the
supreme law of the Republic, the Constitution restricts
in effect the powers of the state, because the state
may not violate the rights in the Constitution without
fulfilling the requirements of the Constitution. A charter
of religious rights which further describes the content of
the right, will outline even more clearly the relationship
between religion and the state, and will secure the good
relationship already existing between religion and the
state. This relationship in terms of which freedom of
religion and the autonomy of religious institutions are
recognised, and religious institutions are accommodated
positively and impartially in the state, should be
stipulated unequivocally in a charter of religious rights.
5.2. By leaving the right to religious freedom undefined in
the Constitution, one actually accepts that the content
of the right will be determined through court decisions
and other measures on an ad hoc basis, in other words, as
issues and difficulties occur. This is a process over which
religious institutions have little control. Section 234, on
the contrary, creates the possibility to propose a charter
of religious rights in which the content of the right is
spelled out fully in a single charter.
5.3. Throughout history conflict between religion and the
state occurred from time to time in most countries
and there were even periods of large scale religious
persecution. In our country, as well, issues sometimes
occur over which religious institutions differ from the
state or where the state take [sic] steps that limit or may
limit religious freedom. By defining and stipulating
clearly in an act this relationship, and what is allowed
and what not, unnecessary state interference with
religion which may occur in future can be prevented,
and uncertainty, misunderstanding and unnecessary
conflict between religion and the state can be eliminated.
5.4. A charter of religious rights can contribute to the spirit
of tolerance prevailing between the various religions in
South Africa. Compared to many other countries, South
Africa is particularly blessed in this respect, and insofar
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as a charter of religious rights can enhance this spirit,
South Africans should do their utmost to maintain and
strengthen the good relationship among the different
religions.
6.

There are interesting international examples to which one
may refer in this regard. All the primary international bills of
rights protect the right to freedom of religion, but not a single
one elaborates on the content of the right. (See for example
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article
18 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and Article 1 of the
African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights.) That is why
the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, which spells out
the content of the right to freedom of religion much more
extensively, was adopted in 1981. (See also the Declaration on
the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities of 1992.) Domestically as well as
internationally there are in other words precedents for a
charter of religious rights.
We think this is a very important matter for the whole of
South Africa and that we as religious communities have a big
responsibility to make a contribution to freedom of religion
in our country through a Charter of Religious Rights. We
look forward to see you at the workshop.
Kind regards
(signed)
Pieter Coertzen, University of Stellenbosch (09 November
2007).

At the February 14, 2008 meeting, representatives of
four religions, 33 Christian denominations and various
individuals attended the workshop and worked through the
proposed Charter to try and reach consensus. A few invited
papers were delivered.
What occurred, and in spectacular fashion, was that the
major religions present – Hindu, Christian (including
Catholic, Orthodox, Zion Christian Church and Reformed
branches), Jewish, Muslim and others gave one hundred
percent support not only to the need for a document but to
the process being used and the terms of the document itself.
A continuity committee was set up following the February
14, 2008 meeting made up of the following: Prof. P. Coertzen,
theologian, Stellenbosch; Dr William Langeveldt, Commission
of Culture, Religion and Linguistic Rights; Dr C. Landman
– Commission for Culture, Religion and Linguistic Rights;
Prof. Rassie Malherbe – Law, University of Johannesburg;
Sheik Achmat Sedick – Muslim Judicial Counsel, Cape Town
and; Rabbi Green – Jewish Orthodox Religion, Cape Town
(representing Chief Rabbi Warren Goldstein, Chief Rabbi of
South Africa). To this were added, in subsequent months:
Iain T. Benson, lawyer and consultant, France and Canada;
Dr. Nokosolo Ndende, University of South Africa, African
Customary Religions and; Elder Eric Jackson, Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Johannesburg.
Meetings were held over the spring and summer of 2008
and included contact with the following groups in addition
http://www.hts.org.za
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to those representatives from the major religions who had
been at the Stellenbosch original meeting in February 2008:
The House of Traditional Leaders, Pretoria (including all
but two of their regional representatives); The Steering
Committee for the Roman Catholic Bishops of South Africa
(present was Cardinal Napier); The Central Committee of the
Dutch Reformed Church; The South African Human Rights
Commission; Editorial Committee for the Religion Hub
(Television) of the South African Broadcasting Corporation;
the Executive of the National Religious Leaders’ Forum; The
General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches;
a representative of the South African Buddhist Religion and;
a representative of the Rastafarian Religion.

Conclusion of meetings
The groups consulted (which eventually extended
considerably beyond the above list) continued to express
support and interest in the Charter. Many substantive
comments were received, some of these from individuals and
others from academics in many countries internationally.
These consultations continued and at the time of the public
signing of the draft in October 2010, version 6.0 represented
the insights and contributions of hundreds of interventions,
contributions and suggestions being made from throughout
South Africa and internationally.
The process has allowed for very broad and deep consultation
across a wide spectrum of religions in South Africa and some
of the key groups involved in religion and human rights.

The public signing ceremony and
future anticipated steps
The public signing of the document on October 21, 2010 at
the main board room of the University of Johannesburg was
followed by a meeting of the signatories that established a
Council for Religious Rights and Freedoms pursuant to
section 185 (1) (c) of the Constitution and other relevant
provisions of the Promotion and Protection of Cultural, Religious
and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002. At the time of this
writing a steering committee has been established of members
and experts that will continue to raise support for the Charter
and draft a Constitution for the Council to move ahead in
discussions with the government. Those who have invested
so much time and work in the process are hopeful that it will
be passed into law for the guidance of South African society
in future cases.
The document in its most recent version is attached as an
Appendix to this article.

Conclusion

The significance of the proposed Charter for
South Africa and other countries
What has occurred has been deep, meaningful and, might
well be in the long run of great importance not only within
doi:10.4102/hts.v69i1.1319
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South Africa but in many other countries as well.18 The
process, document and meetings have shown both that
religions can cooperate at a high level of sophisticated and
mature discussion and that principles important to each
religion can be shared and recognised as important to all
religions. These principles are a substantive contribution to
the principles of modus vivendi as they include not only the
right to join a religion but also to leave one.
Finally, the process, which is ongoing, shows that there are
alternatives to political and legal avoidance of key aspects
when the civil society organisations themselves show
leadership in important areas in the context of a constitutional
document set up so as to encourage the involvement of
civil society in its ongoing development. The process also
provides a means of more holistic principled development
than the ad hoc nature of litigation on a case-by-case basis.
In this respect, use of Section 234 of the South African
Constitution provides an important landmark for those
who are concerned that constitutional development has
become the property of a small number of judges and activist
litigation strategists.
It remains to be seen how the political process will respect
the hard work that has been done by civil society. A sign of
respect would be to recognise that the Charter represents an
extraordinary cooperation between as wide a set of interest
groups as could likely be assembled. It did not include every
possible group – that goal would be impossible of realisation.
It is for the Government, in conversation with the Council for
Religious Rights and Freedoms that has been established, to
determine whether Section 234 of the Constitution will prove
to be useful and usable in South Africa.
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Appendix 1

DRAFT South African Charter of Religious Rights
and Freedoms (Version 6.0, August 2009)1
General Outline: [Note: This Outline is for Convenience
only and did not form part of the Charter as Signed]
1. Particularly notable amongst the provisions are the
following:
2. Preamble, particularly #7
3. Right to change religion 2.1
4. Principle of religious accommodation 2.2
5. Medical services or procedure protections 2.3
6. Non-establishment provision 3.1
7. Free-exercise provision 4.0 (including access to sacred
places 4.1);
8. Freedom of expression (including public debate 6.1);
9. Right to share religious faith (6.1) including to attempt to
convert others (6.2);
10. Access to public media (6.3) [a recent addition after
representations from African customary religions about
difficulty getting access to public media];
11. Advocacy of hatred “that constitutes incitement to
immediate violence or physical harm” (6.4) [narrowing
from “hate speech” which should be abolished from
human rights according to Moon Report recently released
in Canada2];
12. Education, primary parental, right of information etc.
(7.0)
13. Conditions of employment (9.1);
14. Relationship between Church and state recognising
autonomy (9.3) and confessional protection (9.4);
15. Religion not defined by “service to adherents” so includes
“whether they serve persons with different convictions”. (12)

South African Charter of Religious Rights and
Freedoms (As amended 06 August 2009 and
Signed October 21, 2010 – DRAFT Version 6.0)
Preamble
1. WHEREAS human beings have inherent dignity, and a
capacity and need to believe and organize their beliefs in
accordance with their foundational documents, tenets of
faith or traditions; and
2. WHEREAS this capacity and need determine their lives
and are worthy of protection; and
3. WHEREAS religious belief embraces all of life,
including the state, and the constitutional recognition
and protection of the right to freedom of religion is an
important mechanism for the equitable regulation of the
relationship between the state and religious institutions;
and
4. WHEREAS religious institutions are entitled to
enjoy recognition, protection and co-operation in a
constitutional state as institutions that function with
jurisdictional independence; and
1.No earlier versions are given as a comparison of the changes made is beyond the
scope of this article. Such an analysis, doubtless interesting, awaits future attention
and would best follow final approval of the Charter and its passage into law.
2.This Report of Professor Richard Moon (2008) – dealing with hate speech laws and
recommending their abolition in a Human Rights context – may be found at http://
www.chrc-ccdp.ca/publications/report_moon_rapport/toc_tdm-eng.aspx
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5. WHEREAS it is recognized that rights impose the
corresponding duty on everybody in society to respect
the rights of others; and
6. WHEREAS the state through its governing institutions
has the responsibility to govern justly, constructively and
impartially in the interest of everybody in society; and
7. WHEREAS religious belief may deepen our understanding
of justice, love, compassion, culture, democracy, human
dignity, equality, freedom, rights and obligations, as well
as our understanding of the importance of community
and relationship in our lives and in society, and may
therefore be beneficial for the common good; and
8. WHEREAS the recognition and effective protection of
the rights of religious communities and institutions will
contribute to a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance
among the people of South Africa; and

Therefore the following Charter of Religious Rights and
Freedoms is hereby adopted as follows:
1. Every person (where applicable in this Charter “person”
includes a religious institution or association) has the
right to believe according to their own religious or
philosophical convictions, and to choose which faith,
worldview, religion, or religious institution to subscribe
to, affiliate with or belong to.
2. No person may be forced to believe, what to believe or
not to believe, or to act against their convictions.
2.1. Every person has the right to change their faith,
religion, convictions or religious institution, or to form
a new religious community or religious institution.
2.2. Every person has the right to have their religious
beliefs reasonably accommodated.
2.3. Every person may on the ground of their religious or
other convictions refuse to (a) participate or indirectly
assist in or refer for certain activities, such as of a
military or educational nature, or (b) perform certain
duties or deliver certain services, including medical
or related (including pharmaceutical) services or
procedures.
2.4. Every person has the right to have their religious or
other convictions taken into account in receiving or
withholding of medical treatment.
2.5. Every person has the right not to be subjected to any
form of force or indoctrination that may cause the
destruction of their religion, beliefs or worldview.
3. Every person has the right to the impartiality and
protection of the state in respect of religion.
3.1. The state must create a positive and safe environment
for the exercise of religious freedom, but may not as
the state promote, favour or prejudice a particular
faith, religion or conviction, and may not indoctrinate
anyone in respect of religion.
3.2. No person may be unfairly discriminated against
on the ground of their faith, religion, or religious
affiliation.
4. Subject to the duty of reasonable accommodation and
the need to provide essential services, every person has
the right to the private or public, and individual or joint,
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observance or exercise of their religious beliefs, which
may include but are not limited to reading and discussion
of sacred texts, confession, proclamation, worship, prayer,
witness, order, attire, appearance, diet, customs, rituals
and pilgrimages, and the observance of religious and
other sacred days of rest, festivals and ceremonies.
4.1. Every person has the right to private access to sacred
places and burial sites relevant to their religious or
other convictions. Such access, and the preservation
of such places and sites, must be regulated within the
law and with due regard for property rights.
4.2. Persons of the same conviction have the right to
associate with one another, form, join and maintain
religious and other associations, institutions and
denominations, organise religious meetings and other
collective activities, and establish and maintain places
of religious practice, the sanctity of which shall be
respected.
4.3. Every person has the right to communicate nationally
and internationally with individuals and institutions
on religious and other matters, and to travel, visit,
meet and enter into relationships or association with
them.
4.4. Every person has the right to single-faith religious
observances, expression and activities in state or
state-aided institutions, as regulated by the relevant
institution, and as long as it is conducted on an
equitable and free and voluntary basis.
5. Every person, religious community or religious institution
has the right to maintain traditions and systems of
religious personal, matrimonial and family law that are
consistent with the Constitution and are recognised by
law.
6. Every person has the right to freedom of expression in
respect of religion.
6.1. Every person has the right to (a) make public statements
and participate in public debate on religious grounds,
(b) produce, publish and disseminate religious
publications and other religious material, and (c)
conduct scholarly research and related activities in
accordance with their religious or other convictions.
6.2. Every person has the right to share their religious
convictions with others on a voluntary basis.
6.3. Every religious institution has the right to have access
to public media and public broadcasting in respect of
religious matters and such access must be regulated
fairly.
6.4. Every person has the right to religious dignity, which
includes not to be victimised or slandered on the
ground of their faith, religion, convictions or religious
actions. The advocacy of hatred that is based on
religion, and that constitutes incitement to imminent
violence or to cause physical harm, is not allowed.
7. Every person has the right to be educated or to educate
their children, or have them educated, in accordance with
their religious or philosophical convictions.
7.1. The state, which includes any public school, has the
duty to respect this right and to inform and consult
with parents on these matters. Parents may withdraw
http://www.hts.org.za
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their children from school activities or programs
inconsistent with their religious or philosophical
convictions.
7.2. Every educational institution may adopt a particular
religious or other ethos, as long as it is observed in
an equitable, free, voluntary and non-discriminatory
way, and with due regard to the rights of minorities.
The preference for a particular religious ethos does not
constitute discrimination in breach of the constitution
with respect to religious education.
7.3. Every private educational institution established on
the basis of a particular religion, philosophy or faith
may impart its religious or other convictions to all
children enrolled in that institution, and may refuse
to promote, teach or practice any religious or other
conviction other than its own. Children (or their
parents) who do not subscribe to the religious or
other convictions practised in that institution waive
their right to insist not to participate in the religious
activities of the institution.
8. Every person has the right on a voluntary basis to receive
and provide religious education, training and instruction.
The state may subsidise such education, training and
instruction.
9. Every religious institution has the right to institutional
freedom of religion.
9.1. Every religious institution has the jurisdictional
independence to (a) determine its own confessions,
doctrines and ordinances, (b) decide for itself in all
matters regarding its doctrines and ordinances, and
(c) in compliance with the principles of tolerance,
fairness and accountability regulate its own internal
affairs, including organisational structures and
procedures, the ordination, conditions of service,
discipline and dismissal of office-bearers and
members, the appointment, conditions of employment
and dismissal of employees and volunteers, and
membership requirements.
9.2. Every religious institution is recognised and protected
as an institution that functions with jurisdictional
independence, and towards which the state, through
its governing institutions, has the responsibility to
govern justly, constructively and impartially in the
interest of everybody in society.
9.3. The state, including the judiciary, must respect
the jurisdictional independence of every religious
institution, and may not regulate or prescribe matters
of doctrine and ordinances.
9.4. The confidentiality of the internal affairs and
communications of a religious institution must be
respected. Specifically, the privileged nature of any
religious communication that has been made with an
expectation of confidentiality must be respected in
legal proceedings.
9.5. Every religious institution is subject to the law of
the land, and must justify any disagreement, or civil
dissent, on the basis of its religious convictions or
doctrines.
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10. Every religious institution that qualifies as a juristic
person has the right to participate in legal matters, for
example by concluding contracts, acquiring, maintaining
and disposal of property, and access to the courts. The
state may allow religious institutions tax, charitable and
other benefits.
11. Every person has the right, for religious purposes and
in furthering their objectives, to solicit, receive, manage,
allocate and spend voluntary financial and other forms
of support and contributions. The confidentiality of such
support and contributions must be respected.
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12. Every person has the right on religious or other grounds,
and in accordance with their ethos, and irrespective of
whether they receive state-aid, and of whether they serve
persons with different convictions, to conduct relief,
upliftment, social justice, developmental, charity and
welfare work in the community, establish, maintain and
contribute to charity and welfare associations, and solicit,
manage, distribute and spend funds for this purpose.
©Continuity Committee of the South African Charter of
Religious Rights and Freedoms, (2010) and the Council for
the Promotion of Religious Rights and Freedoms (2011).
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